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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to present an international finance view of 
the 2008 crisis. By relying on four traditional international finance 
classes of models (the intertemporal current account approach, two 
exchange rate risk premium models and open-economy economic 
policy models), we addresed, theoretically, the importance of macro-
finance aspects of the episode such as portfolio reallocation and its 
aggregate effects, using data for supporting the claims. Moreover, by 
telling the story of the crisis, divided in three periods (Great 
Moderation, Great Recession and Euro Crisis) we provided an 
overview of the deployments as well as an understanding of the 
development from a slightly point of view.  
Keywords: financial crisis, risk premium, monetary policy, fiscal 
policy  
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1. An Once-in-a-Century Crisis 
 
One knows a financial crisis when it happens. 
Charles Kindleberger2 
Dealing with financial crises is not a new feature of capitalist economies. 
Since the end of Bretton Woods the frequency of crises has increased3. 
And this is a problem for eight centuries or more4. Nevertheless, since 
the Great Depression, no other episode was as strong as the 2008 
financial crisis5. An unlikely crisis hit the world economy (Costa Filho, 
2015) emerging from problems in the US housing market, spreading to 
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the rest of the world throughout a complex derivatives network and the 
economic policy responding to the fall Brunnermeier (2009). 
It is precisely the transmission and international impact of the 
crisis that is addressed in this paper and can be summarized in the 
following research question: from the international finance lens, how can 
one explain the financial crisis and its aftermath? In order to answer this 
question,  I used four international finance models (the intertemporal 
current account approach, two exchange rate risk premium models and 
open-economy economic policy models) and this paper presents the 
overview of the macro-financial events before, during and after the Great 
Financial Crisis. 
For understanding the financial crisis, here I divided it into three 
acts: in the first, calamity and apparent control over business cycles led 
us to bake the worst crisis since the Great Depression. Act two addresses 
the issue of problems arising from the US housing market impacting 
economies around the world, with a special focus on developed 
economies, rather than emerging markets, which managed to recover 
faster from the episode. The climax is exposed in act three with the so-
called Euro crisis. Within the Eurozone, asymmetric behaviors before 
and after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brother in September of 2008 
exposed the fragile economic arrangement upon which the single 
currency was built on. Wrong-timing austerity policies and the harms of 
the internal devaluation hurt countries differently throughout the crisis. 
To address the entire “play", this paper is organized as follows. 
The next section addresses the economic environment before the 
financial crisis, in which financial deregulation, combined with dynamic 
inefficiency in China resulting in a global savings glut that influenced 
interest rates on the other side of the world. Section three deals with the 
crisis itself, focusing not only on how it emerged within the US financial 
system, but also (and specially) on how it has spread abroad, using 
portfolio a macro-financial model to understand the exchange rate risk 
premium channel of the crisis and a textbook open-economy model for 
analyzing how policymakers responded to the shock. Section four 
analyzes the Euro crisis and the importance of the exchange rate regime, 
internal devaluation and portfolio allocations based on consumption 
patterns. Finally, section five presents the final remarks. 
2. Baking a Financial Crisis 
The 1970s and the 1980s were complicated periods for economic 
policymakers. The distortions that war periods brought and the 
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stagflation from the fiscal expansion called for tough monetary policies. 
The contraction of the monetary base growth imposed by the US Central 
Bank when Paul Volcker took over led not only to a recession in the US, 
but also foreign debt problems (and defaults) in Latin America and 
capital outflow in developed countries. The burst of a bubble in Japan 
put the economy into a stagnant path and since then the economy has 
been struggling to get back on track. After the mid-1980s though, the 
world experienced a new reality: low macroeconomic volatility with 
sustained growth. 
The so-called “Great Moderation" was a period of prosperity. 
Not only output, but also inflation had low volatility, especially in the 
2000s, as can be seen in Figure 1: 
 
Figure  1: Five-years Coefficient of Variation of World’s GDP 
annual growth rates (%) 
Data from the World Economic Outlook, October 2018. 
The lower volatility was welcomed and embraced. But why did 
volatility diminished? Bernanke (2004) brought three possible 
explanations: structural, policy and luck. The first is related to the effects 
of institutional changes, technology gains, and business practices that 
served as a “buffer" for shocks that once hit the economy resulting in 
severe recessions. 
The second reason would be the result of greater efficiency and 
efficacy of macroeconomic policy making. Monetary policy had been 
seen not only as the main responsible for disciplining inflation, but also 
for managing business cycles. 
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The “luck hypothesis" relied not on changes in the economic 
mechanisms (structure and/or policy), but rather on changes in the 
shocks themselves. They might had been softer and less frequent, 
bringing down macroeconomic volatility. 
Bernanke (2004) advocates that, regardless the fact that the new 
reality may be a combination of the three hypotheses, there was 
improvement in monetary policymaking. The output variance/inflation 
variance trade-off, despite of any possibility of a “divine coincidence", 
was operating in a lower lever (withe the “trade-off curve" shifting to the 
left6. 
The thrill of an era “without" business cycles (at least in the way 
they had manifest themselves in the past) generated the incentives for 
academic research to change its focus. Macroeconomics arouse as a 
response to the intellectual challenges imposed by the Great Depression, 
but in the 2000s, the feeling was that this was overcome. A redirection 
to field was prosed, to a more supply-side orientation (Lucas Jr, 2003). 
Without business cycles (apparently, at least), some important 
aspects of international monetary conditions might had facilitated the 
emergence of an economic environment prone to the problems revealed 
within the 2008 crisis. The emergence of an important agent might had 
changed monetary conditions on the other side of the globe. 
2.1.The Global Savings Glut Hypothesis 
In the 2000s, Bernanke  (2005) raised the following hypothesis: the 
current account deficit in US was a consequence of the high savings 
in China. Indeed, if we look at 2007 data, presented in Figure 2, we 
can see very different patterns. The US grew less and experienced a 
deficit in the current account, whereas China had a higher growth 
combined with a current account surplus (sphere sizes in the graph 
represent PPP-adjusted per capita GDP). 
                                                          
6 The “divine coincidence" is a term that Blanchard and Galí (2007) in reference to 
Goodfriend and King (1997), in which by stabilizing inflation, output is also 
stabilized. However, the divine coincidence breaks in forward-looking models 
(Clarida et. al., 2000). 
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Figure  2: China and US: Savings and Growth 
Data from the World Economic Outlook, October 2018. 
 Bernanke  (2005) defend that the intertemporal decision in China 
impacted the US, with an intertemporal-current-account-model 
underneath the argument. Their reasoning can be shown via a 
combination of a simple two-period model and an account identity as 
follows. 
2.2.  Current Account: an intertemporal model 
The reference for this approach is Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). Let us 
work with a simpler model, though the main idea still holds. In the 
model, individuals live for two periods and at a given time 𝑡, generations 
may overlap. The economy is composed by two (representative) agente: 
families and firms. 
2.2.1.  Families 
Agents maximize an utility function that depends on consumption (𝐶) in 
both periods of life 
 max
𝐶𝑡,𝐶𝑡+1
𝑈 =
𝐶𝑡
1−𝛾
1−𝛾
+ (1 + 𝜃)−1
𝐶𝑡+1
1−𝛾
1−𝛾
 
subject to the fact that they only work in the first period of life, yielding 
the following budget constraints: 
𝐶𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡
𝐶𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡+1)𝑆𝑡
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where 𝛾 is the relative risk aversion coefficient, 𝑆 stands for savings, 𝑊 
is labor income, 𝑟 is the interest rate and 𝜃 is the discount rate. We can 
rewrite the problem in the following way: 
max
𝑆𝑡
𝑈 =
(𝑊𝑡−𝑆𝑡)
1−𝛾
1−𝛾
+ (1 + 𝜃)−1
((1+𝑟𝑡+1)𝑆𝑡)
1−𝛾
1−𝛾
 
From the first order condition we have 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡[(1 + 𝜃)
1
𝛾(1 + 𝑟𝑡+1)
1−
1
𝛾 + 1]−1 (1) 
Note that in the equation above, the maximum is obtained when 
the utility loss by an infinitesimal increase in savings is equal to the 
present value of the utility gained by the increase in consumption in the 
second period of life. Optimal savings is thus a function of labor income 
(
𝜕𝑆𝑡
𝜕𝑊𝑡
> 0), the discount rate (
𝜕𝑆𝑡
𝜕𝜃
< 0) and the interest rate: 
 𝛾 < 1 ⇒
𝜕𝑆𝑡
𝜕𝑟𝑡+1
> 0 (substitution effect is greater than income effect); 
 𝛾 > 1
𝜕𝑆𝑡
𝜕𝑟𝑡+1
< 0 (income effect is greater than substitution effect); 
 𝛾 = 1
𝜕𝑆𝑡
𝜕𝑟
= 0 (effects cancel out each other). 
2.2.2.  Firms 
In a perfectly competitive environment, firms maximize profits (Π𝑡) by 
choosing the stock of per capita capital (𝑘𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡/𝑁𝑡, where 𝐾 is the 
stock of capital and 𝑁 the population size) subject to its depreciation rate 
(𝛿) and the available technology: 
 max
𝐾𝑡
Π𝑡 = 𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝛼 − 𝛿𝑘𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡𝑘𝑡 − 𝑊𝑡, 
where 𝛼 is the capital share in the production. The first order condition 
implies that the (net) marginal product of capital is equal to the interest 
rate: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝛼−1 − 𝛿.  (2) 
The zero profits condition also implies that 
 𝑊𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝛼 . (3) 
Using equations (1), (2) and (3) and the population dynamics we have 
𝑘𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑛)
−1(1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝛼[(1 + 𝜃)
1
𝛾(1 + 𝛼𝐴𝑘𝑡
𝛼−1 − 𝛿)
1−
1
𝛾 + 1]−1. 
 Stability requires 
𝜕𝑘𝑡+1
𝜕𝑘𝑡
< 0. Under dynamic inneficency (i.e. 
income effect higher than substitution effect in the partial derivative of 
equation (1)), China’s savings lowered interest rates inducing more 
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savings, what would create an unstable path if the economy was not 
open. 
2.3.  Savings and the Current Account 
We may use a national accounts identity to link the previous simple 
model to the open-economy savings determination: 
𝑆 − 𝐼 = 𝑋 − 𝑀 (4) 
Equation (4) presents the equality between the capital and 
financial account (left hand side) and the current account (right hand 
side). Thus, let us make a simplification and cautiously use the identity 
to infer causality. If there is an increase in the decision of savings (via 
the aforesaid dynamic inneficiency, for instance), holding everything 
else constant, the country will incur in a commercial surplus. Therefore, 
it will export savings. But to where?  
Kim and Wu (2008) may shed some light on it. Agency ratings 
may direct flows with credit ratings. Therefore, investment instruments 
such as pension funds, for instance, when looking for a destination of its 
investments, may be attracted (due to their statutes) by triple-A bonds. 
Developed financial markets may absorb the inflow and the US has the 
most developed one. The consequence of the foreign capital inflow is a 
persistent interest rate fall as can be seen in Figure 3. 
Figure  3: Effective Federal Funds Rate 
Data from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(US)/FRED. 
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How the global savings glut hypothesis is linked to the “Great 
Recession"? To answer that question we may have to revisit the literature 
relating finance and growth. Driffill (2003) presents a survey on the 
matter. The author questions which financial architecture is the best, 
opposing two models: the US-UK “hands-off banks" (low participation 
in management and strong short term finance) with a Japanese-German 
style, in which banks focus on long term projects and have a more active 
role in management. 
King and Levine (1993) use cross-country regression and find 
evidence that corroborates with the Schumpeterian hypothesis that a well 
developed financial market is essential for economic development. The 
financial markets could 
• Reduce risks (trough diversification and monitoring);  
• Help to allocate resources; 
• Discipline/monitor managers;  
• Mobilize capital;  
• Facilitate goods and services trade.  
The benefits of the development of financial markets do not 
come without costs. Deidda and Fattouh (2002) found a non-linear 
relation between finance and growth. Arcand, Berkes, and Panizza 
(2015) also found evidence of a non-linear dynamics. The authors built 
a model that may help us to link the global savings glut hypothesis with 
the 2008 financial crisis. Financial development may provide several 
opportunities. Since agents are risk averse, they may incur in more 
financial transactions than the social optimal. This would divert 
resources from other productive usages to (too much) finance. The 
decision of China (and other surplus countries) regarding savings (and 
the interest rate fall as a consequence), combined with a deregulation 
period, led to reckless subprime lending in the US housing market. It 
turns out that (fast) financial development made the world riskier (Rajan, 
2006). 
3. The International Aspect of Crisis 
The low interest rates and abundant capital created the incentives for the 
investor to look for new opportunities. Deregulation made it possible. 
The advent of a (new) global player – China – contained goods and 
services inflation (Calomiris, 2009) and there were less incentives for 
increasing the policy rate. Actually, before the crisis, interest rate 
deviations from the prescription of a Taylor rule are associated with the 
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causes of the crisis (Rose and Spiegel, 2012) and China‘s savings glut 
may have pushed it away from the usual behavior. 
With the excess of resources and the recent financial 
innovations, the housing market was stimulated. Housing prices started 
to rise and the low interest rate environment made it easy to take a loan 
and renegotiate it. Risky loans for agents such as the “NINJAs" (a person 
with no income, no job or assets) and the sensation of risk diversification 
was in the core of the housing market dynamics in mid 2000s 
(Brunnermeier, 2009). The result was the sharp rise (above the sample 
average – gray line) in housing prices shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure  4: S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index 
Data from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(US)/FRED. 
 Eventually, the interest rates would rise. Moreover, there is 
nothing guaranteeing that prices might not fall (specially after a bubbly 
increase). Renegotiation became harder and mortgage defaults triggered 
the crisis, albeit there is a view that mortgage default arouse actually 
from real estate investors, rather than subprime credit (Albanesi, De 
Giorgi,  & Nosal 2017) and the “crisis" aspect of the episode may have 
been established due to the change of expectations (Gennaioli & 
Shleifer, 2018). The problem is that the loans were “packed" and 
distributed to free space for more loans, while complex derivatives that 
were created to reduce risk amplifying it, making possible to transmit the 
crisis internationally (Brunnermeier, 2009). The financial crisis emerged 
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from problems in the US housing market and spread throughout the 
world7. 
Investors had to relocate portfolio amid a rise in uncertainty 
and risk aversion. The international financial markets thus moved 
capital from risky countries to the US, in a flight to quality 
dynamics. The counterintuitive feature of this movement is that, 
usually, capital moves away from countries where the crisis was 
born. This time was different, however. The safety guaranteed by 
US bonds was more important than the economic problems and the 
troubles within its financial system. 
The portfolio reallocation can be analyzed with the 
international Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), following 
Dornbusch (1980) and Frankel (1982). 
3.1. International CAPM 
International investors allocate resources based on risk-return evaluation 
from a Von Neumannâ€“Morgenstern utility function, 𝑈𝑖(?̅?𝑖; 𝜎𝑊
2 ), 
with 
𝜕𝑈𝑖
𝜕?̅?𝑖
> 0;
𝜕𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝜎𝑊
2 < 0,              (5) 
where ?̅?𝑖 é is expected return of a portfolio (𝐸[?̃?] = ?̅?) and 𝜎𝑊
2  is the 
variance of the return. There are two types of assets in the portfolio: 
domestic assets, with share 𝑎, yielding returns equal to ?̃? and foreign 
assets, with share (1 − 𝑎), yielding returns equal to ?̃?∗. Given a initial 
wealth (𝑊0,𝑖), the expected portfolio return is thus: 
?̃?𝑖 = [𝑎 ⋅ (1 + ?̃?) + (1 − 𝑎) ⋅ (1 + ?̃?
∗)] ⋅ 𝑊0,𝑖. (6) 
Working with the definition of the variance of the return we have 
𝜎𝑊
2 = [𝑎2𝜎𝑟
2 + (1 − 𝑎)2𝜎𝑟∗
2 + 2𝑎(1 − 𝑎)𝜎𝑟,𝑟∗] ⋅ 𝑊0,𝑖,             (7) 
where 𝜎𝑟
2 is the variance of domestic assets’ return, 𝜎𝑟∗
2  is the variance 
of foreign assets’ return and 𝜎𝑟,𝑟∗ is the covariance between domestic 
and foreign interest rates. It is useful to define a portfolio of minimum 
variance. 
                                                          
7 [Kamin and DeMarco, 2012]. See [Wolf, 2015] for the developments of the crisis, the 
transmissions, the troubles within Europe and the learning that arouse from the 
episode. 
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3.1.1.  Minimum Variance Portfolio 
What is the allocation that minimizes portfolio variance? This can be 
found by choosing the share of domestic assets that minimizes equation 
(7). 
min
𝑎
𝜎𝑊
2 = [𝑎2𝜎𝑟
2 + (1 − 𝑎)2𝜎𝑟∗
2 + 2𝑎(1 − 𝑎)𝜎𝑟,𝑟∗] ⋅ 𝑊0,𝑖. 
The first order condition for an initial wealth different from zero yields a 
domestics assets share of: 
?̂?𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
𝜎𝑟∗
2 −𝜎𝑟,𝑟∗
Δ
, (5') 
where Δ = 𝑉𝐴𝑅[(1 + 𝑟) − (1 + 𝑟∗)] = 𝜎𝑟
2 + 𝜎𝑟∗
2 − 2𝜎𝑟,𝑟∗. Now we 
may go back to the investor’s problem. 
3.1.2.  Investor’s Problem 
Each investor 𝑖 maximizes its expected utility subject the aforesaid 
constraints as follows: 
max
𝑎
𝑈𝑖(?̅?𝑖; 𝜎𝑊
2 ) 
s.t. 
𝐸[?̃?𝑖] = ?̅?𝑖 = [𝑎 ⋅ (1 + ?̅?) + (1 − 𝑎) ⋅ (1 + ?̅?
∗)] ⋅ 𝑊0,𝑖, (3) 
𝜎𝑊
2 = [𝑎2𝜎𝑟
2 + (1 − 𝑎)2𝜎𝑟∗
2 + 2𝑎(1 − 𝑎)𝜎𝑟,𝑟∗] ⋅ 𝑊0,𝑖. (4) 
The first order condition is thus 
𝜕𝑈𝑖
𝜕?̅?𝑖
⋅
𝜕?̅?𝑖
𝜕𝑎
+
𝜕𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝜎𝑊
2 ⋅
𝜕𝜎𝑊
2
𝜕𝑎
= 0. 
In the equation above the maringal cost with respect to volatility is equal 
to marginal expected return. Define 
𝜕𝑈𝑖
𝜕?̅?𝑖
= 𝑈′1 and 
𝜕𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝜎𝑊
2 = 𝑈′2. Then 
we have 
𝑎∗ = ?̂?𝑚𝑖𝑛 +
1
𝜃𝑖
⋅
[?̅? − ?̅?∗]
Δ
⇐ [?̅? − ?̅?∗] = 𝜃𝑖Δ(𝑎
∗ − ?̂?𝑚𝑖𝑛), 
where 
1
𝜃𝑖
= (
𝑈′1
2𝑈′2
𝑊0,𝑖). 
3.1.3.  International Equilibrium 
Define 𝑉𝑆 as the supply of domestic assets, 𝑉∗𝑆 as the supply of foreign 
assets and global wealth as 𝑊 = 𝑉𝑆 + 𝑉∗𝑆. Assets market equilibrium 
requires 
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𝑉𝑆 = 𝑉𝐷 , 
where 𝑉𝐷 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑎𝑖
∗𝑊𝑖. From the previous equations we have 
𝑉𝑆 = ?̂?𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑊 +
[?̅? − ?̅?∗]
Δ
∑
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑊𝑖
𝜃𝑖
. 
Define 1/𝜃 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1
𝑊𝑖
𝑊𝜃𝑖
 as the market degree of risk aversion. Then, 
 [?̅? − ?̅?∗] = (
𝑉𝑆
𝑉𝑆 + 𝑉𝑆∗
− ?̂?𝑚𝑖𝑛)Δ𝜃. 
3.1.4.  Risk premium 
International real interest rates (foreign and domestic) with consumption 
inflation (𝜋𝐶) can be defined as: 
𝑟 = 𝑖 − 𝜋𝐶 ,
𝑟∗ = 𝑖∗ − 𝜋∗𝐶 .
 
Consumption inflation is a convex combination of domestic 
inflation (with share 0 < 𝜆 < 1) and foreign inflation (for the foreign 
country, the same reasoning applis, but with an asterisk. Therefore 
𝜋𝐶 = 𝜆𝜋 + (1 − 𝜆)(𝜋∗ + 𝑑)
𝜋∗𝐶 = 𝜆∗(𝜋 + 𝑑) + (1 − 𝜆∗)(𝜋∗)
 
where 𝑑 expected exchange rate change. If 𝜆 = 𝜆∗ we have that 
 ?̂?𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝜆. 
whenever 𝜆 ≠ 𝜆∗, we have that: 
 ?̂?𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
𝜆∗2+(1−𝜆)𝜆∗
(1−𝜆+𝜆∗)2
. 
Finally: 
[?̅? − ?̅?∗] = 𝜎𝑑
2𝜃(
𝑉𝑆
𝑉𝑆+𝑉𝑆∗
− ?̂?𝑚𝑖𝑛). (8) 
The equation above can be interpreted as follows. The risk 
premium required for deviating from the minimum variance portfolio 
share is a function of the supply of domestic assets relative to total assets, 
exchange rate volatility and risk aversion. 
We may use equation (8) to understand some features of the 
crisis. For instance, interest rate differentials augmented during the crisis. 
One could infer, from the model, that this was a response to a) risk 
aversion (𝜃) and b) increased volatility (𝜎𝑑
2). The portfolio reallocation 
due to the spread of the crisis may had being driven by an “International 
CAPM reasoning". Moreover, the liquidity crisis with peak in December 
2008 may also be understood using the previous equation. Banks were 
facing the “Queen of Spades problem" [Taylor, 2009]. The interbank 
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interest rate rose due to an increase in risk aversion (as equation (8) 
prescribes. 
3.2.  Monetary Policy in a Liquidity Trap 
The worst crisis after the Great Depression emerged after decades 
without a global recession8. This time, however, a debt-deflation 
depression was avoided9. With that in mind the Federal Reserve initiated 
a balance-sheet expansion (Figure 5). The monetary endeavor now 
known as “quantitative easing" had three phases, resulting in an amount 
of total assets held in the Federal Reserve system five times its level in 
the first day for 2008. 
 
Figure  5: Federal Reserve Banks: Total Assets (jan/08 = 100) 
Data from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(US)/FRED. 
The Federal Reserve “toolkit" was discriminated in Clouse et al. (2000) 
and Bernanke (2002) and can be summarized as follows: 
 Expand monetary base;  
 Purchase of bonds with longer maturities; 
 Twist Operation: buy long-term bonds and sell short-term bonds; 
 Buying foreign-denominated bonds.  
The first three were implemented and no sign of inflation was 
seen, This was due to the fact that monetary (and fiscal) expansion in an 
                                                          
8 Imbs (2010). 
9 See Fisher (1933) for the debt-deflation explanation of the Great Depression. 
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economy within a liquidity trap does not increase inflation. Moreover, a 
fiscal expansion does not increase interest rates, so it also can (and 
should) be implemented in a liquidit trap (DeLong &Summers, 2012). 
A simple way to see the argument is to use a Mundell-Fleming approach 
extended it with a liquidity trap (with a kinked LM curve), even though 
it is a small open-economy model. Figure 6 presents the impact of an 
expansionary fiscal policy: 
 
Figure  6: Mundell-Fleming in a Liquidity Trap 
After an initial fiscal expansion (such as the Economic Stimuls 
Act, injecting USD 100 bi in the US economy) and the quantitative 
easing programs, deflation was avoided. The bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers and rescue of AIG and other institutions led to liquidity 
problems since identifying which institutions were in trouble was hard 
during the crisis (Taylor, 2009). Countries that had more room for 
expansionary policies (higher interest rates and a better fiscal 
management – the latter as a combination of both fiscal balance and 
grow debt) before the crisis, experienced a less severe first year (Costa 
Filho, 2016). 
The combination of credit expansion and housing prices bubble 
boom-burst preceding a recession due to a financial crisis usually 
indicates a slow recovery10. This is exactly what one should expect from 
the 2008 crisis. In 2011, overall economic performance seemed to have 
restored in a “aggregate supply" relation. The world experienced a 
positive cross-country relation of GPD growth and inflation (Figure 7). 
                                                          
10 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Reinhart and Reinhart (2010). 
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Figure  7: World’s Aggregate Supply Curve (2011) 
Data from the World Economic Outlook, October 2018. 
In 2012, however, the picture looks quite different. Also, the 
macroeconomics of low inflation imposes some difficulties11. 
 
Figure  8: World’s Aggregate Supply Curve (2012) 
Data from the World Economic Outlook April 2017. 
 
                                                          
11 See [Akerlof, Dickens and Perry, , 1996]. 
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What happened? 
4. A Greek Tragedy: The Euro Crisis 
The 2008 financial crisis hit the world economy hard, but different 
countries experienced asymmetric impacts. Even (and specially) 
within the Eurozone, the shock revealed that the far-from-optimal 
currency union was vulnerable12. And its vulnerability was not in 
the fiscal front. Figure 9 presents the current account balance of 
selected Eurozone members. It is easy to see that whereas Germany, 
France and Poland experienced high surpluses, the other countries 
like Portugal, Spain, Italy Ireland and Greece had high deficits. 
 
Figure  9: Current Account Balance (%GDP) 
Data from the World Economic Outlook, April 2017. 
At the same time, with two exceptions (Greece and Italy), 
the countries that experienced current account deficits had 
“controlled" levels of gross debt as share of GDP. Ireland and Spain 
even had a downward trajectory, while Portugal with its long-run 
problems were already with a growing debt, but still far below 
Italian figures, for instance (Figure 10). 
                                                          
12 See Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963) for the theory of optimum currency areas. 
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Figure  10: Gross Debt (%GDP) 
Data from the World Economic Outlook April 2017. 
Public debt usually grows in recessions and the financial 
crisis was no exception. However, within a currency union, the fixed 
exchange rate regime imposes a hard reality: fiscal austerity cannot 
be accommodated by the nominal exchange rate depreciation. 
Furthermore, the lack of monetary policy imposed another 
restriction (see Figure 11). The wrong-timing austerity programs 
amplified the recession. 
 
Figure  11: Austerity with a Fixed Exchange Rate 
The imbalances in the currency union previously to the crisis 
should be resolved. The economy always finds a way to adjust. The 
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problem in the crisis was the chosen path. Without the nominal 
exchange rate to restore the balance-of-payments equilibrium, the 
commercial relations have to respond to the real exchange rate 
movements via relative price changes. The velocity, though, is very 
different. The equation below presents the bilateral definition of the 
real exchange rate (𝑄): 
𝑄 = 𝑒 ⋅
𝑃∗
𝑃
, 
where 𝑒 stands for the nominal exchange rate and 𝑃∗ and 𝑃 and 
foreign and domestic prices, respectively. Note that for a real 
exchange rate devaluation, given the fixed exchange rate regime, 
there are two possibilities (or a convex combination of both): a rise 
on foreign prices or a fall in domestic prices. The first one was out 
of question due to inflation intolerance in Germany. The only option 
was to cut prices. However, due to nominal price rigidity, in order 
to reduce prices (or to reduce inflation relative to foreign inflation), 
there should be a cost reduction. But the trajectory of labor costs 
imposed some difficulties: 
Figure  12: Unit Labor Costs (hours worked) 
Data from the OECD. 
 Figure 12 shows that while German labor costs diminished 
in the 2000-07 period, Spain’s and Portugal’s costs rose. Therefore, 
to obtain a cost reduction, given nominal wage rigidity, 
unemployment should augment. The adjust in quantities, rather than 
in prices takes more time and the burden of the internal devaluation 
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was carried by Eurozone member to balance the current account and 
restore exports competitiveness. 
 
Figure  13: Internal Devaluation 
In the meantime, Eurozone countries had to deal with its own 
crisis, “inside" the previous one. In 2009, Greece registered a fiscal 
deficit of 10% of GDP, Ireland and Spain saw their housing bubbles 
burst (Wolf, 2015). Investors than realized that each country’s 
ability to honor its own commitments regarding sovereign debt is 
different. The shock moved from a pooling equilibrium in which 
“everybody was Germany" to a separator equilibrium, with high 
interest rates for a few countries as can be seen in Figure 14. 
  
Figure  14: Long-term Interest Rates 
Data from the OECD. 
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Suddenly, investors realized that Euro countries are subject to 
the “original sin"13. Since the creation of the euro, countries have 
abdicated the possibility of money-printing and therefore, even though 
they are all part of the Eurozone, debt is denominated in a currency they 
cannot issue. This made the investors tolerate different levels of debt 
according to each countries idiosyncrasies14. Investor thus demanded 
different risk premiums for Eurozone countries. This can be seen with 
the Consumption CAPM model15. 
4.1. The Consumption CAPM 
A representative household maximizes the present value 
(discounted by 0 < 𝛽 < 1) of its expected utility by choosing 
consumption (𝑐) for each time 𝑡: 
max
𝑐𝑡
𝐸𝑡[∑
∞
𝑡=0 𝛽
𝑡𝑈(𝑐𝑡)]                       (9) 
subject to the following budget constraint: 
𝑞𝑡
𝑖𝑥𝑡
𝑖 + 𝑐𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑖 (𝑞𝑡
𝑖 + 𝜋𝑡
𝑖),  (10) 
where 𝑞𝑡
𝑖 is the price of asset 𝑖, 𝑥𝑡
𝑖 the amount of asset 𝑖, 𝑦𝑡 is the 
labor income and 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑖 (𝑞𝑡
𝑖 + 𝜋𝑡
𝑖) represents previous period (𝑡 − 1) 
savings, evaluated at 𝑡, in which there is not only capital gains, but 
also dividends payment (𝜋𝑡
𝑖). The first order condition results in the 
following equation:  
𝛿𝐸𝑡[
(𝑞𝑡+1
𝑖 +𝜋𝑡+1
𝑖 )
𝑞𝑡
𝑈′(𝑐𝑡+1)
𝑈′(𝑐𝑡)
] = 1.                                            (11) 
Define the gross return of asset 𝑖 as 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑖 =
(𝑞𝑡+1
𝑖 +𝜋𝑡+1
𝑖 )
𝑞𝑡
 and 𝑔𝑡+1 =
𝑈′(𝑐𝑡+1)
𝑈′(𝑐𝑡)
 the marginal utility growth. By the definition of variance we 
have: 
?̅?𝑡+1
𝑖 =
1
𝛿?̅?𝑡+1
−
1
?̅?𝑡+1
𝐶𝑂𝑉(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑖 , 𝑔𝑡+1). (12) 
With 𝐸𝑡[𝑅𝑡+1
𝑖 ] = ?̅?𝑡+1
𝑖  e 𝐸𝑡[𝑔𝑡+1] = ?̅?𝑡+1. Let us assume there exists 
an asset 𝑧 such that 𝐶𝑂𝑉(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑧 , 𝑔𝑡+1) = 0. Analogously, we have:  
?̅?𝑡+1
𝑧 =
1
𝛿?̅?𝑡+1
.                                (13) 
Subtracting (9) from (8) yields: 
                                                          
13 See Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) for the concept of the “Original Sin". 
14 See Rogoff, Savastano, and Reinhart, (2003) for the concept of ‘debt 
intolerance". 
15 Cumby (1988). 
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 (?̅?𝑡+1
𝑖 − ?̅?𝑡+1
𝑧 ) = −
𝐶𝑂𝑉(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑖 ,𝑔𝑡+1)
?̅?𝑡+1
.  (14) 
The expected excess return of an asset 𝑖 over the risk free 
asset 𝑧 is negatively correlated with the covariance between 
marginal utility growth and the gross return of asset 𝑖. If the asset 
provides a ‘natural hedge" for the investor relative its consumption 
patterns, the investor qualifies the asset as a “good" one and asks for 
a lower risk premium. On the other hand, if the return is low, on 
average, exactly at time the investor needs the most, for allocating 
its resources on the asset it will ask for a higher risk premium. 
Let us define a “benchmark currency" 𝑖 = 1. we have that 
 (?̅?𝑡+1
𝑖 − ?̅?𝑡+1
𝑧 ) =
𝛽𝑖
𝛽1
(?̅?𝑡+1
1 − ?̅?𝑡+1
𝑧 ), 
where 𝛽𝑖 = −
𝐶𝑂𝑉(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑖 ,𝑔𝑡+1)
?̅?𝑡+1
 e 𝛽1 = −
𝐶𝑂𝑉(𝑅𝑡+1
1 ,𝑔𝑡+1)
?̅?𝑡+1
. Remember 
that, in the original CAPM, 𝛽𝑎 = 𝐶𝑂𝑉(𝑎, 𝑀)/𝜎𝑀
2 . 
4.1.1.  Risk Premium and the Euro Crisis 
The convertibility risk manifested itself as a risk premium on 
sovereign debt interest rates of Eurozone countries over German 
bonds. The troubles in Greece specifically after the discover of the 
lies public statistics. From one country to another, contagion spread 
and asset prices felt the possibility of a more intense recessions due 
to, i) the austerity programs and, ii) the revealed intensity of the 
crisis. Moreover, even an Eurozone breakup was on table (at least 
on the foreseeable scenarios)16. Following Kaminsky, Reinhart and 
Vegh (2003), for one economy contaminate another, there are some 
necessary elements (a trinity, as they call it): 
 Leveraged common investor.  
 Surprise.  
 Sudden stop.  
Who was the Leveraged common investor? The German 
banks (Wolf, 2015). The deficit in the aforesaid euro countries was 
financed via capital and financial account surplus. When the crisis 
hit the monetary union, banks from the core countries were exposed. 
Since the likelihood of the 2008 crisis was very low (Costa Filho, 
2015) and the events after the crisis occurred in unknown territory, 
                                                          
16 See [?] for the panic-austerity combination. 
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surprise was definitely present. The problems within some bank 
system in euro countries (Wolf, 2015) impulsed capital the outflow. 
The sudden halt was inevitable. 
In the peak of the Euro crisis, an expression changed the path 
to a sustainable one. The president of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) said the bank would do “whatever it takes" to solve the 
crisis17. It has worked. The “Long-Term Refinancing Operation" 
served as a mechanism for the ECB to inject money into the 
economies by respecting its mandate and statute. The ECB cannot 
lend directly to a country, only to banks. So they demanded public 
bonds as warranties as in the representation below: 
 
Figure  15: Long-Term Refinancing Operation Flow 
Under these dynamics, spreads diminished since the demand 
for sovereign bonds increased. Moreover, the “Outright Monetary 
Transaction" (buying sovereign bonds in the secondary market) also 
helped to diminish spreads. Furthermore, the injection in the 
banking system could also provide a buffer to contain contagion18. 
5. Final Remarks 
The 2008 financial crisis, like the Great Depression, attracted the 
attention of researchers and it is still a majorly discussed topic. 
Much effort has been made to understand its roots, its transmission 
and how to prevent another episode with the same proportions to 
happen. Nevertheless, it seems that the usual approach is to start 
from the microeocnomic dynamics of US housing market and then 
keep increasing the radius of analysis to macroeocnomic events. In 
some sense, this paper also contains that structure. However, by 
summoning four internation finance models, one may provide some 
reasoning of the outspreading of the crisis. 
From the intertemporal current account approach model we 
may understand the role of foreign savings in the monetary 
conditions of the US. After the fall, the international CAPM helps 
                                                          
17 Wolf (2015). 
18 See Allen and Gale (2000) for a model where contagion arises from a shock on 
liquidity preferences as an equilibrium result. 
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us to understand the effects of portfolio reallocation, whereas its 
consumption versions are useful for deployments of the euro crisis. 
Moreover, textbook open-economy economic policy models seem 
still useful for clarifying the effects of the chosen policies not only 
in the US, but also in other countries such the ones sharing the single 
currency in Europe. For future research, an extended version of the 
model could also shed some light on the relegated alternative paths 
(such as high inflation within the euro area, asymetrically distributed 
towards commercial surpluses countries) during the crisis. 
As this paper tries to present, the traditional international 
finance models capture the essence of the 2008 financial crisis and 
are a good starting point for further analysis, highlighting the 
importance of macro-finance dynamics such portfolio choices, risk 
premiums and financial market development dynamics. 
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